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Abstract 
Today, it is widely recognized that housing price boom-bust cycles lay at the heart of 
the latest global financial crisis. A housing boom is commonly defined as a period in 
which a housing price exceeds its fundamental value. Like most of the European Union 
member countries, many economies experienced the housing boom during the period of 
2000–2006. Moreover, housing booms turned into busts in many countries at about the 
same period, causing a deep crisis. Our aim in this paper is to look for the determinants 
of housing price cycles and to investigate the relationship between housing boom-bust 
cycles and indicators of housing development. For this, we first detect the turning 
points of housing prices and identify housing price boom-bust cycles for 27 European 
countries and the US from 1995 to 2013 using quarterly data and a judgmentally 
augmented version of the dating procedure due to Ball (1994). Having obtained a 
categorization of boom versus boom-bust countries, in the second step, we reveal the 
relationships between housing cycles, macroeconomic factors and financial 
development by means of panel probit analysis. 
Keywords: European Union; House prices; Boom-bust cycles; Financial development. 
JEL Classification: E44; C51; C58; G01. 
 
I.Introduction  
Up to date numerous countries have faced with several economic problems and 
continue to encounter them. A part of these problems grew with the turning of an economic 
bubble (boom) to burst (bust) and caused serious crisis in the end. The United States (1984), 
Denmark (1987), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991), Japan (1992) , France 
(1994), and the United Kingdom (1995) are some examples of countries that faced with boom-
bust cycles in their economies (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008:4-1). Most of crisis occurred as of 
1980s has come about with large asset price decreases –that will be referred to as busts, which 
large increases in the asset prices –that will be referred to as booms– transform to. In fact, 
historically, many of asset price booms did not end in busts. In fact, asset price booms are 
experienced especially in the real estate and stock markets either separately or jointly. On the 
other hand, the liberalization of the markets, and the opening of the economy looking for the 
determinants of housing price cycles and the relationship between housing boom-bust cycles 
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and indicators of housing development to the international markets, and the internationalization 
of the capital in increased manner, have caused asset price booms in more countries in the 
recent years. Moreover, when the boom-busts in an advanced country with a large economy and 
that country enters a crisis, the effects of the crisis is not limited to that country alone but 
spreads to other countries as well. As a matter of fact, this situation is verified with the boom-
busts in the asset prices experienced in certain Southeast Asian countries in the 1990s and in the 
real estate markets in the US in the 2000s. 
The asset price busts adversely affect the economies in many ways and initiate 
economic recessions. This was confirmed by IMF (2003) on the asset price boom-bust cycles 
experienced in the 1970s and the 1990s (IMF, 2003:63-68). Particularly, starting with the 1990s 
the asset markets have had a gradually growing role in the macroeconomic dynamics. This has 
led many researchers to focus on the revelation of the sources of the changes in the prices of 
assets, in measuring the changes in the prices, in determining the levels these changes can 
impose threat on the economy etc. In the literature while at first, most of studies were interested 
in the stock price fluctuations, in 2000s the attention increasingly shifted toward real estate price 
dynamics. An increasing interest generally stems from the housing price boom lying at the heart 
of the 2007-2008 global crisis, but also a bigger wealth loss caused by the larger price 
fluctuations in the housing markets than that of stock markets. For instance, during the dot-com 
bust, the value of American households’ equity holdings declined by 44 percent (USD 5.4 
trillion). The real estate bust that started at the end of 2006 has brought about a 15 percent 
decline in the value of real estate assets (USD 3.7 trillion). However, total wealth lost stood at 
USD 10 trillion for about three years (Crowe et al., 2012:4).  
From 2000 up to 2006, many developed and developing countries have experienced 
simultaneous housing price booms at an unprecedented level. Again, the boom in many of these 
countries turned to bust, in the same period. Many of the European Union (EU) member 
countries took place among the advanced countries which experienced housing boom. 
Moreover, the EU was the primary region which was the most affected by the crisis which 
originated in the US, has faced with sovereign debt crisis in some of Eurozone countries as of 
the last quarter of 2009. The main reason of debt crisis in some countries was the house price 
bust, e.g. Ireland and Spain. In fact, the housing price bust did not occur in all the EU countries 
which faced with the housing price boom. 
Owing to its everlasting importance, in this paper our aim is to examine the 
determinants of housing price cycles and to research on whether there is relationship between 
housing boom-bust cycles and financial development of 28 countries.4 In specific, we elaborate 
the following questions: (1) what are the determinants of housing boom-bust cycles? (2) Is there 
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any linkage between housing boom-bust cycles and financial development? To this end, we first 
employ a judgmentally augmented version of the dating procedure due to Ball (1994)5 and 
reveal that almost all of 28 countries considered have faced with housing price booms (26 boom 
countries) while more than half of them have experienced housing price busts (21 boom-bust 
countries). Consequently, we investigated the answers of the aforementioned questions by 
means of panel probit analyses, where we examined the determinants of housing price cycles 
and the association between housing boom-bust cycles and financial development for the period 
of 2000-2012. 
Two things distinguish this study from the existing ones in the literature. First, we use a 
simple and transparent methodology, which is a judgmentally augmented version that of Ball 
(1994) to identify the turning points of housing price cycles. Our approach not only allows us to 
obtain a clear-cut dating of cycles but also to sub-divide the boom periods with respect to pace 
of price increases, i.e. rapid and slow. Second, to our best knowledge, this is the first paper that 
relates housing boom-bust cycles to financial development.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section II lays on the definition of 
housing boom-bust cycles while Section III explains how we identify boom countries and 
boom-bust countries. Section IV analyses the association between housing cycles and 
macroeconomic/financial variables and Section V concludes the paper. 
II.Boom-Bust Cycles in Housing Markets  
There are different terms used by economists to explain the behaviors of asset prices 
such as ‘bubble’, ‘boom’, ‘panic’, ‘bust’, ‘burst’, ‘crash’, and ‘irrational exuberance’. A housing 
boom (or bubble) is commonly defined as a period in which housing price exceeds its 
fundamental value (Kindleberger, 2005; Hebling, 2004; Ikromov and Yavas, 2012; Xiong, 
2013). Inherent properties in housing markets can generate house price cycles and cause house 
prices to substantially deviate from their fundamental values in the short term. Minsky (1992) 
has defined a bubble on the basis of how an asset class is financed. For the housing market to 
meet Minsky’s definition of a bubble, three conditions must be met: increases in real (inflation-
adjusted) housing prices and mortgage debt, along with persistent rental income losses (Minsky, 
1992:7). 
                                                 
5 Ball (1994) has introduced the method for determining disinflation episodes and calculating the associated sacrifice 
ratios in moderate- inflation OECD countries. Later on, this method has been used for identifying inflation episodes 
by Boschen and Weise (2003), Domac and Yucel (2005) and Vansteenkiste (2009). To the best of our knowledge, 
Ball (1994) methodology, that has been used to determine the peak and trough dates of consumer price up to now, is 
applied to housing prices for the first time in order to identify the housing boom-bust cycles. The approach in this 
paper is less complex and more practical than those of the previous studies. 
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Figure 1. Housing and Equity Prices Declines (number of cases) 
 
Source: IMF (2003:68). 
In IMF (2003:63-68), “a bust is defined as a peak-to-trough decline where the price 
change fell into the top quartile of all declines during bear markets; similarly, a boom is defined 
as a trough-to-peak rise where the price increase was in the top quartile of all increases. This 
procedure does not require booms to be followed by busts, as the two types of events are 
determined independently.” In other words, a housing price boom comprises of large increases 
in housing prices (i.e. overvaluation of housing prices) while a housing price bust is a rapid drop 
of prices. 
The past developments in financial markets show that there are relationships among 
asset prices and that especially stock and housing booms-busts are generally seemed together as 
confirmed by IMF (2003).6 IMF (2003) finds that linkages between stock and housing prices 
within countries are very strong, as rising stock prices during a boom is likely to raise housing 
prices. Besides, it also finds that when the timing of the busts in the two asset groups is 
compared, it is seen that half of all the housing price crashes matched the stock price busts 
(Figure 1). 
III.Identification of Boom and Boom-Bust Countries 
A. Literature on Dating of Housing Boom-Bust Cycles  
In this study, we are looking for the determinants of housing price cycles and the 
relationship between housing boom-bust cycles and indicators of housing development. 
Therefore, it is important to determine which of the countries considered had only a boom in the 
housing markets and which ones had both the boom and the burst. With this aim, the first step is 
to define and to identify housing price boom and bust periods in the countries considered, 
because housing boom or bust is commonly defined as a period. In other words, we firstly will 
detect turning points in the housing prices. Turning points are also called peaks and troughs 
                                                 
6 IMF (2003:63-68) covers 14 industrial countries for the period of 1970-2003. 
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(peaks is the period immediately preceding a decline in real activity, or recession; troughs is the 
period immediately preceding an upturn, or expansion (Boldin, 1994:99). As it is seen, a turning 
point is a date that separates two phases of peaks and troughs in economic cycle.  
It is seemed that the earliest studies have been interested in forecasting economic cycles 
(e.g. recession and recovery periods). Then, some have focused on measuring equity price 
cycles, but there are little attempts to date housing price boom and bust cycles. With striking 
increases in housing prices in many countries in the world from the middle of 1990s to of 
2000s, the focus has shifted from equity price to housing price booms and busts, and 
determining the dates of housing boom and bust periods is getting more attractive.  
Although determination of the turning points is an important issue in the analysis of the 
housing boom/bust cycles, however, there is not only one method that has been generally 
accepted. Many methods have been developed to measure the general economic cycles. Later, 
these methods have been used to determine the turning points of the fluctuations in the prices 
(i.e. consumer prices, stock prices and housing prices) by using them as they are or by making 
certain changes.  
The purpose of all the studies mentioned above is to better estimate the turning points in 
the business cycles and in doing so to find a method which is less complex and which could be 
applied more easily in practice  
When we look at studies on housing price movements and on determining the housing 
price cycles in the literature, it is seen that housing price bubble (boom) detection has been 
widely studied, and that studies on determining and quantifying housing price boom and bust 
cycles are getting increase in last decade, especially after the deep global financial crisis. This 
might be stemmed from the fact that the housing price boom-bust cycles experienced in the U.S. 
in 2007 had a prominent role in the latest global financial crisis, and also the fact that many 
countries had faced with housing boom and bust in the same periods and encountered with deep 
crisis. However, it is difficult to determine and identify housing price boom and bust periods. 
There are several approaches adopted and many studies based on different criteria and the 
different results found on this topic. In the same time, it is seemed that the statistical methods 
are used much more for dating periods of housing price cycles than the methods of modelling.7 
In most of the studies on housing boom-bust cycles, the methods of identifying the 
cycles have indirectly been used with the aim of investigating the characteristics and 
determinants and implications of booms and busts in housing markets (e.g. Muth, 1981; IMF, 
2004; BIS, 2005; Bordo and Wheelock, 2006; Burnside et al., 2011; Agnello and Schuknecht, 
2012; Gerdesmeier et al., 2012; Igan and Loungani, 2012); or the macroeconomic and financial 
effects of these cycles (IMF, 2003, 2009; Gerdesmeier et al., 2010; Huang, 2013). In other side, 
                                                 
7 See Harding (2008:2) and Gerdesmeier et al. (2012:4). 
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some of them on this topic look at the relationship between housing boom-bust cycles and 
policies implemented (Bordo and Jeanne, 2002) and the relationship between housing bubble 
and crisis (Baker, 2008; Cheng et al., 2013; Xiong, 2013) while some examine house price 
returns feeding into the short-run dynamics (Corradin and Fontana, 2013). In these studies, a 
boom (bust) in house prices is generally defined as a period to the annual growth rate of house 
prices, or as a house price gap or as a longer-lasting deviations with observations falling outside 
the certain interval. 
Like the methods developed for analysis of business cycle, one of the common 
properties among them is that they are generally followed two steps to define the boom-bust 
cycles in the housing markets (see Harding and Pagan, 2002:367, Hebling, 2004:31). First step 
is to determine housing price cycles. Turning points in the housing prices are considered as a 
cycle. In the second step, it is identified the periods of booms and busts. In other words, it is 
decided which turning points (peaks and troughs) in housing prices will be evaluated as a boom 
(bust). It is important for this to be decided the threshold. Generally, it is defined that the 
threshold is fixed at a constant or it is selected a different multiple of the standard deviation. 
Similar way and also, similar criterion have been followed by most of researchers who examine 
housing markets. 
Nevertheless, it is seemed that most of the methods developed for analysis of business 
cycle above mentioned have been applied in measuring housing boom-bust cycles by using a 
full way or by making certain changes. Just like Agnello and Schuknecht (2011), in order to 
define the periods of housing cycles for 55 countries (developed and emerging economies) over 
the period 1970-2007 Igan and Loungani (2012) have followed the method of Harding and 
Pagan (2002) and Harding (2003), who uses the NBER method as considering on quarterly 
basis. Then, Corradin and Fontana (2013) have applied the same method to 13 countries in 
European Economic Area (including eight Eurozone countries) for the period of 1980-2013Q1. 
IMF (2003) in her study to determine when the bubbles in asset (both stock and 
housing) prices will burst, run the method of the Hebling (2004) who followed Pagan and 
Soussonov (2003), who slightly modified the NBER cycle dating procedure. Another method 
developed by Bordo and Jeanne (2002) to research into the relation between economic 
instability, money policy and asset price cycles has been frequently used for those studying the 
housing market (e.g. IMF, 2009), In other side, Gerdesmeier et al. (2010) also employ the 
method of Bordo and Jeanne (2002) but as a threshold by selecting a different multiple of the 
standard deviation. 
Gerdesmeier et al. (2012) identify housing price boom-bust cycles by running the 
different technique (quantile regression technique) from those above explained This technique 
where booms/busts are represented by longer-lasting deviations from equilibrium, with 
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observations falling outside the [20,80] interval (for booms and busts, respectively) 
(Gerdesmeier et al., 2012:22). 
While Yiu et al. (2012) was applying the new method (recursive regression technique) 
developed by Phillips et al. (2007) to detecting the bubble in Hong Kong residential property 
markets during the period 1993Q3-2011Q3, Gomez-Gonzales et al. (2013) used the same 
method in Colombia housing markets for the period 1994-2012Q1. They date stamp the origin 
and conclusion of the explosive behavior in housing prices as they are running this method. 
B.Dating Procedure of House Price Cycles  
Against the background provided in the earlier sections, it is apparent that the formation 
and bust of house price booms do not match the same pattern and timing in all countries that we 
examine in this study. In order to develop a solid understanding of the related issues and to 
obtain good statistical estimates, it is crucial to characterize the movements of house prices and 
to identify boom-bust cycles. Like Harding and Pagan (2002), Hebling (2004) and Igan and 
Loungani (2012), we follow two steps for dating housing price boom-bust cycles (Harding and 
Pagan, 2002:367; Hebling, 2004:31); (i) determination of housing price cycles and (ii) 
identification of booms and busts. 
In this paper, a judgmentally augmented version of the dating procedure due to Ball 
(1994)8 is used to find the trough and peak dates of real house prices and mark the price 
movements as rapidly increasing, slowly increasing and falling. The purpose of all the studies 
mentioned above is to better estimate the turning points in the business cycles and in doing so to 
find a method which is less complex and which could be applied more easily in practice The 
dating method due to Ball (1994) used in this paper to determine the housing price cycles is less 
complex and can be applied more easily in practice than that of previous studies on dating 
housing cycles. 
Prior to implementing the dating procedure, quarterly real house prices were calculated 
as the ratio of nominal house prices to consumer prices index, both seasonally adjusted, for each 
country9. In seasonal adjustment we used the Census X12 procedure. The base year for the 
computed real house prices (seasonally adjusted) was set as 2005, for visual ease, with the 
exception of Luxembourg for which the base year was set as 2007. Data sources for nominal 
house prices and consumer price indices are listed in Appendix A. 
                                                 
8 See Boschen and Weise (2003) and Domac and Yucel (2005). 
9 See Table 1 for a list and classification of the countries included in the study. 
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Figure 2. A Pictorial Overview of the Dating Procedure Employed 
 
Identification of housing price episodes 
comprises of three stages: In stage I, using the 
approach due to Ball (1994) the trough (square) 
and peak (circle) points of change in prices are 
found – bottom panel. This allows us to mark the 
period (t0,t1) as a rapid increase (RAPID) period 
for the level series. 
In stage II, the peak point (triangle) of the price 
series is identified – top panel. The period (t1,t2), 
hence, is marked a slow increase (SLOW) 
episode. 
RAPID and SLOW episodes together, (t0,t2) are 
viewed as BOOM episodes. 
Finally, in stage III, we seek for a period during 
which the prices series fall from its peak point to 
a tranquil state. This leaves us with (t2,t3) 
marked as a BUST episode – top panel. 
In actual implementation, the top and bottom 
panels include the level of real housing prices 
and the seven-quarter centered moving average 
of the quarterly real housing price inflation rates, 
respectively. 
 
Following Ball (1994) we first construct a trend real housing price inflation series, for 
each country, as the seven-quarter centered moving average of the quarterly real housing price 
inflation rates over the period of 1995Q1-2013Q3, wherever the data are available. Thus, a peak 
(trough) of housing price inflation is defined as a period in which the seven-quarter centered 
moving average of housing price inflation is the maximum (minimum) within a seven-quarter 
symmetric window. Our choice of seven-quarters instead of the nine-quarters as in Ball (1994) 
has been driven by data limitations and it limits losses in the final number of observations. Once 
the trend housing price inflation has been computed, the trough and peak dates of house price 
are identified as dates at which trend housing price inflation is lower (higher) than in the 
preceding and succeeding three quarters. It is important to note that such use of the procedure 
due to Ball (1994) provides us with the periods of sustained increases of real house prices. We 
name these periods as episodes of rapidly increasing real house prices (RAPID). By definition, 
the house prices keep increasing10 after the peak dates of house price time series until reaching 
its maximum before falling or attaining a tranquil state. The episodes from the peak date of 
housing price inflation to the peak date of housing price are then marked as episodes of slowly 
increasing house prices (SLOW). RAPID and SLOW episodes, together, yield the price increase 
                                                 
10 It is trivial that at a peak point suggested by Ball (1994) procedure, the smoothed rate of increase (trend inflation) 
of house prices reaches its maximum. Starting from a trough, house price series under consideration follows an 
accelerated course of increase. After the peak date of trend inflation, house prices enter a course of slower increase 
until the date at which trend inflation hits zero. Once this point is exceeded a fall in house prices is observed. 
t1 t2 t3
II III
time
t0 t1
Change of price series
time
Level of price series
I
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periods suggested by the popular four-quarter rule in the earlier literature.11 The major 
advantage of our simple approach then is the ability to distinguish the increase in real house 
prices with respect to pace. Thus, RAPID and SLOW episodes together are accepted as a 
housing price BOOM period. See Figure 2 for a pictorial description of our procedure. 
Regarding the numerical workings of our approach data availability forms a major 
obstacle. As our quarterly house price data set spans the period from 1995Q1 to 2013Q3, use of 
a seven-quarter centered moving average and consecutive choice of maximum and minimum 
trend housing price inflation figures based on seven-quarter time windows cause some data loss. 
In that it has been possible, in cases of couple of countries, to obtain peak dates at the beginning 
of data without their accompanying troughs. We enjoyed a limited liberty to mark such periods 
as house price upturns.12 
Table 1. Classification of Countries 
Eurozone Non-Eurozone Other 
   Austria*    Italy**    Bulgaria**    United States** 
   Belgium*    Luxembourg    Czech Republic**    Iceland** 
   Cyprus**    Malta**    Denmark**    Norway* 
   Estonia**    Netherlands**    Hungary**  
   Finland*    Portugal**    Latvia**  
   France**    Slovakia**    Lithuania**  
   Germany    Slovenia**    Sweden*  
   Greece**    Spain**    United Kingdom**  
   Ireland**    
All countries but those marked with (*) experienced a BOOM. (**) indicates countries experienced a BUST. 
Once the dating of upturns has been completed, the marking of downturns turns out to 
be an easier task. A period of downturn or BUST is basically one with starting at the peak point 
of real house prices and ending at a period where house prices tranquil or ending at the end of 
available data. Tabular and graphical presentations of our classification of real house price 
movements are presented in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively.13 
After process of identifying boom-bust cycles, we find that all countries (26 countries), 
except Germany and Luxembourg, experienced the boom and that, most of boom countries 
                                                 
11 According to the four-quarter rule, four or more consecutive periods of price increase is considered as an upturn 
(boom period) and four or more consecutive periods of price decline as a downturn (bust period). See Igan and 
Loungani (2012) for a recent use of this approach. 
12 Regarding the rate of increase of real house prices during RAPID increase episodes, it is observed that house prices 
increase by an average of 1% per quarter. As the percentage increase in real house prices is the difference between 
percentage change in nominal house prices and rate of consumer price inflation, this figure indicates an increase in 
nominal house prices 1 percentage point in excess of consumer price inflation. This kind of a behavior of prices is a 
serious one once we take into account the sustained nature of house price increases during booms, see Appendix B 
and C. 
13 In the case of price downturns, we have repeated the procedure due to Ball (1994) in the reversed direction so as to 
mark the periods of falling house prices as periods of rapid fall (RAPIDFALL) versus slow fall (SLOWFALL). We 
have succeeded in this exercise to some extent and marked the slowly falling and rapidly falling house price episodes, 
as well. Although we analyze only the BUST episodes (RAPIDFALL and SLOWFALL together) in the subsequent 
sections, a full list of episodes is provided in Appendix B and C for convenience. 
10 
 
them (19 countries) faced with bust (Table 1). Our findings coincide with that of previous 
studies used different methods for defining the periods of housing boom-bust cycles.14 
IV.Empirical Analysis 
A.Macroeconomic Determinants of Housing Price Cycles 
Against the background provided in the earlier sections, this section presents our 
empirical estimates on macroeconomic determinants of housing price cycles. This analysis first 
helps us to understand the basic mechanisms shaping the housing prices. Second, the results out 
of this section are intended as a basis for our analysis of financial development indicators of the 
next sub-section.  
We consider four different paces here, namely BOOM, RAPID, SLOW and BUST 
where each of these has been defined as a separate binary dependent variable. For each of the 
RAPID, SLOW and BUST, we defined separate annual series of binary indicators following the 
simple rule that years with (without) the desired property are marked with 1 (0)15 for years from 
2000 to 201216. In case a rapid increase episode (in quarterly data set) is followed by a slow 
increase episode within a year, that year has been marked with 1 in favor of slow increase. 
BOOM is defined as the sum of RAPID and SLOW in a straightforward manner. At the end, the 
data set was structured as a panel with 26 cross-sections17 (countries) and 13 periods (years from 
2000 to 2012). Numbers of BOOM, RAPID, SLOW and BUST cases against time are provided 
in Figure 3 and data sources for our explanatory variables related with financial sector are 
provided in Appendix A. 
As mandated by the binary structure of our dependent variables and panel structure of 
our data, we use a random-effects probit regression framework18 where our estimation strategy 
                                                 
14 In order to give some idea about the viability of the episodes extracted from data in this study, we compared them 
to those suggested by Agnello and Schuknecht (2011) and Igan and Loungani (2012) on an annual basis. Our simple 
counting exercise suggests that our boom episodes conform to those of Agnello and Schuknecht (2011) 59% and 
those of Igan and Loungani (2012) 89% of the time. When we consider both boom and bust episodes, these figures 
are revealed as 51% and 54%, respectively. Note that, the congruence between Agnello and Schuknecht (2011) and 
Igan and Loungani (2012) is 35% for boom periods and 23% for boom and bust periods together. So, despite the 
differences in data and dating procedures, our approach guarantees an adequate level of overlap with the recent 
studies in the literature. 
15 Preference over an annual frequency reflects a tendency toward avoiding data related complications like seasonal 
adjustment which might be quite problematic while using macroeconomic variables of many countries. 
16 As we focus on those years with ample global liquidity and on the global financial crisis of 2007 onwards, our 
annual dataset for probit analysis has been restricted to the period of 2000-2012. 
17 Germany and Luxembourg are excluded from statistical assessment due to the fact that no boom-bust pattern of 
house prices was observed in these two economies. 
18 The general form of our estimating equation is
it it it
Y x u  , where 
it
Y  is the binary dependent variable (BOOM, 
RAPID, SLOW or BUST),
it
x is a matrix of observable explanatory variables with its coefficient vector  , itu being 
the error vector for country i in year t . This equation is estimated by means of maximum likelihood. For more on 
probit analysis, see Baltagi (2005), Chapter 11. 
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involves a series of baseline models and two alternative sequences of models. In the baseline 
specifications, we first reveal associations between BOOM and GDPPCGR, M2GRREAL, 
POPGR, AGEDEPYOUNG, GROSSAVGDP and DOMCREGDP. Here, GDPPCGR is the 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita, M2GRREAL is the annual growth rate of real M2 
aggregate of money, POPGR is the annual growth rate of population, AGEDEPYOUNG is the 
age dependency ratio for young population, GROSSAVGDP is the ratio of gross savings to 
GDP and DOMCREPRIVSEC is the ratio of domestic credit extended to private sector to 
GDP.19 Then, we move to associations between the same regressors and RAPID, SLOW and 
BUST, one at a time. In this way, we obtain a rich set of estimates regarding different phases of 
house price cycles. In an attempt to establish a robust analytical framework, we estimate three 
versions of each probit regression, namely for the full sample, for boom-bust countries only and 
for non-boom-bust countries only, with the exception of BUST for which non-boom-bust sub-
sample is degenerate. Baseline estimates are provided in Table 2. 
Figure 3. Frequencies of Episodes (2000-2012) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
In the first of the alternative sequences, we add VIX to our set of regressors and we add 
CROSSBORDER in the second one. VIX is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options and 
it is viewed as a measure of investors’ risk appetite, which formally is the opposite of risk 
aversion. CROSSBORDER, on the other hand, is defined as the annual growth rate of cross-
border credit flows for the world economy. Our estimates including VIX and CROSSBORDER 
                                                 
19 This specification is distilled out of a sequence of preliminary model estimates which are available from authors 
upon request. 
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are reported in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. While interpreting the estimates presented 
these tables, we prefer to use the notation of (X/Y) where X is the Table number (i.e. 2 for Table 
2) and Y is the specification number (running from 1 to 11 in each table). Unless otherwise 
noted, our examination of coefficient estimates is restricted to those having statistical 
significance and to significant models (provided in the last row of each table). 
In our specifications, effects of liquidity have been considered by means of four 
variables, namely M2GRREAL, VIX, CROSSBORDER and DOMCREPRIVSEC. Among 
those variables, while M2GRREAL and DOMCREPRIVSEC are meant to handle domestic 
liquidity, VIX and CROSSBORDER are intended to control for international liquidity 
developments. The reader will notice that although VIX is not a direct measure of liquidity, it 
reflects global liquidity conditions in terms of an implied degree of risk aversion. A quick 
glance at coefficient estimates of these four variables reveal that house price cycles in our 
sample countries have a close association with liquidity, as expected. In the absence of VIX and 
CROSSBORDER, likelihood of a BOOM (BUST) is positively (negatively) associated with 
M2GRREAL (2/1, 2/2, 2/10, 2/11). 
Two additional findings must be underlined as to the effects of real money growth in 
our specifications. First, the positive association between likelihood of a house price increase 
and real money growth does not preserve its statistical significance when we examine the cases 
of RAPID and SLOW separately (2/4 through 2/9). Second, when VIX or CROSSBORDER is 
included in a specification the relationship between BOOM and M2GRREAL disappears at all 
(3/1 through 3/9 and 4/1 through 4/9). The negative relationship between BUST and 
M2GRREAL, on the other hand, preserves its significance through Tables 2 to 4. 
VIX has a negative association with increasing house prices (3/1 through 3/9) and a 
positive association with falling house prices (3/10 and 3/11). However, its association with 
BOOM seems to have been driven by SLOW rather than RAPID episodes. CROSSBORDER 
has, on the other hand, has a positive association with increasing house prices (4/1 through 4/9) 
and a negative association with falling house prices (4/10 and 4/11). It must be noted that, when 
episodes of rapid and slow increase are analyzed separately, it is observed that SLOW rather 
than RAPID episodes are related to cross-border credit flows. 
Domestic credit to private sector has a negative sign consistently in the first three 
specifications and a positive sign in the last two specifications in Tables 2 to 4. Having a look at 
the association of DOMCREPRIVSEC with RAPID and SLOW episodes, it is seen that the 
relationship in the first three specifications are mainly driven by RAPID episodes. 
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An overall assessment of our coefficient estimates for liquidity-related indicators 
suggest that global rather than domestic liquidity has been fueling the house price booms of the 
last decade. 
Since it may be indicative of an increase in life-time income growth, growth of per 
capita income has a special importance in our specifications. In Table 2 and Table 3, 
GDPPCGR has a robust positive association with BOOM, RAPID and SLOW and does not 
display any significant association with BUST episodes. This finding resembles that of the 
earlier literature. In Table 4, however, the positive coefficient of GDPPCGR is preserved only 
in the first two specifications, namely when we consider all BOOM episodes and those episodes 
of boom-bust countries and not in separate analyses of RAPID and SLOW episodes. Recalling 
the role of CROSSBORDER in Table 4, it is more likely that global financial linkages rather 
than a perception of life-time income expansion to drive house price booms. 
Rate of population growth (POPGR), as a potential determinant of housing demand, has 
a significant positive association with BOOM episodes in Table 2 to Table 4, specifications 1 to 
3. It must be underlined that this relationship is driven chiefly by RAPID episodes. Dependency 
ratio of young people (AGEDEPYOUNG) has a positive linkage with increasing house prices, 
as well.20 
Finally, gross savings to income ratio (GROSSAVGDP) displays a positive relationship 
with increasing house prices and a negative relationship with falling house prices. When we 
examine its sign and significance in specifications 4 through 9 in Tables 2 to 4, GROSSAVGDP 
seems to be mainly associated with SLOW episodes. 
Regarding the multi-collinearity of our regressors, it must be noted that the highest 
correlations exist between POPGR and DOMCREPRIVSEC (0.599) and between GDPPCGR 
and CROSSBORDER (0.608), both only coinciding with the conventional threshold of 60 
percent. So, associations among our explanatory variables do not pose a serious threat to quality 
of our estimates. The high correlation of -0.66 between VIX and CROSSBORDER, which do 
not co-exist in any specification, can be noted for information (Appendix D). 
 
                                                 
20 An increasing dependency ratio for young people has been interpreted as a sign of expanding households which 
might ultimately push housing demand upward. Note that exclusion of AGEDEPYOUNG does not considerably alter 
the directions of effect of other variables in our specifications. 
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Table 2. Baseline Estimates with Macroeconomic Variables 
 Dependent Variable 
 BOOM (RAPID+SLOW) RAPID SLOW BUST 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Sample ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB 
GDPPCGR 0.1912*** 0.2508*** -0.0006 0.0742** 0.0817** -0.0222 0.1326*** 0.1672*** 0.0450 -0.0223 -0.0289 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.996) (0.028) (0.042) (0.801) (0.002) (0.004) (0.683) (0.470) (0.348) 
M2GRREAL 0.0169* 0.0211* -0.0131 0.0086 0.0079 -0.0150 0.0032 0.0057 -0.0107 -0.0732** -0.0715*** 
 (0.068) (0.065) (0.620) (0.320) (0.430) (0.523) (0.707) (0.563) (0.726) (0.000) (0.000) 
POPGR 0.6552*** 0.8849*** -3.3503 0.4953*** 0.5908*** -2.4676* 0.2654 0.3938 -1.3358 0.2178 0.1361 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.195) (0.009) (0.004) (0.107) (0.191) (0.116) (0.355) (0.533) (0.672) 
AGEDEPYOUNG 0.0909** 0.1135** -1.6374 0.0498 0.0655 0.1599 0.0054 0.0058 -0.1239 -0.3677*** -0.3062*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.124) (0.132) (0.162) (0.299) (0.855) (0.881) (0.407) (0.000) (0.002) 
GROSSAVGDP 0.0760*** 0.0936*** -0.0313 0.0171 0.0258 0.0495 0.0574*** 0.0602** 0.1271 -0.0935*** -0.0612** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.871) (0.296) (0.298) (0.448) (0.001) (0.024) (0.049) (0.003) (0.046) 
DOMCREPRIVSEC -0.0102*** -0.0122*** -0.1329 -0.0102*** -0.0120*** 0.0148 0.0022 0.0020 -0.0094 0.0246*** 0.0212*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.14) (0.001) (0.004) (0.301) (0.353) (0.489) (0.504) (0.000) (0.000) 
CONSTANT -3.7694*** -4.7423*** 59.6208 -1.7142** -2.1272* -6.0997 -2.9329*** -3.1874*** 0.6243 7.3828*** 5.9182*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.156) (0.042) (0.090) (0.151) (0.000) (0.005) (0.880) (0.001) (0.008) 
SAMPLE SIZE 291 234 57 293 236 57 291 234 57 291 234 
GROUPS 26 21 5 26 21 5 26 21 5 26 21 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
-150.49*** -111.34*** -27.91** -136.20*** -100.38** -31.18 -126.27*** -96.01** -26.51 -98.67*** -93.31*** 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0491) (0.0010) (0.0176) (0.6911) (0.0023) (0.0171) (0.3613) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
p-values are provided in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate statistical significance at the levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 3. Estimates with Macroeconomic Variables After Controlling for Global Risk Appetite 
 Dependent Variable 
 BOOM (RAPID+SLOW) RAPID SLOW BUST 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Sample ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB 
GDPPCGR 0.1421*** 0.1995*** -0.3696* 0.0745** 0.0808* -0.1011 0.0845* 0.1055* -0.0588 0.0612 0.0538 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.077) (0.041) (0.058) (0.352) (0.056) (0.069) (0.640) (0.116) (0.170) 
M2GRREAL 0.0146 0.0178 -0.0361 0.0087 0.0079 -0.0224 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0332 -0.0826*** -0.0811*** 
 (0.128) (0.137) (0.229) (0.321) (0.436) (0.389) (0.953) (0.989) (0.441) (0.000) (0.000) 
VIX -0.0466*** -0.0529*** -0.1452** 0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0486 -0.0530*** -0.0644*** -0.0647 0.0954*** 0.0959*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.018) (0.981) (0.950) (0.178) (0.001) (0.001) (0.123) (0.000) (0.000) 
POPGR 0.5941** 0.8291*** -7.6508** 0.4959*** 0.5899*** -3.5295* 0.1785 0.3072 -2.6869 0.2884 0.2240 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.020) (0.009)** (0.004) (0.060) (0.398) (0.229) (0.166) (0.439) (0.520) 
AGEDEPYOUNG 0.1220*** 0.1534*** -0.7224 0.0496 0.0664 0.2236 0.0263 0.0395 -0.0586 -0.4086*** -0.3590*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.451) (0.144) (0.177) (0.193) (0.404) (0.348) (0.713) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROSSAVGDP 0.0737*** 0.0935*** 0.2032 0.0172 0.0260 0.0470 0.0509*** 0.0569** 0.1346** -0.0814** -0.0512* 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.256) (0.297) (0.299) (0.492) (0.004) (0.033) (0.050) (0.015) (0.102) 
DOMCREPRIVSEC -0.0133*** -0.0158*** -0.0752 -0.0102*** -0.0121*** 0.0186 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0057 0.0301*** 0.0272*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.420) (0.001) (0.006) (0.240) (0.870) (0.788) (0.705) (0.000) (0.000) 
CONSTANT -2.9754** -3.9816** 29.0183 -1.7208* -2.1162* -6.2910 -1.8158** -2.0224* 0.6991 5.1543** 3.9999* 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.431) (0.053) (0.095) (0.174) (0.040) (0.086) (0.870) (0.021) (0.061) 
SAMPLE SIZE 291 234 57 293 236 57 291 234 57 291 234 
GROUPS 26 21 5 26 21 5 26 21 5 26 21 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
-145.87*** -107.20*** -24.38 -136.20*** -100.38** -30.22 -120.50*** -90.20*** -25.18 -87.29*** -81.45*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2144) (0.0021) (0.0321) (0.6865) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.3828) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
p-values are provided in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate statistical significance at the levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 4. Estimates with Macroeconomic Variables After Controlling for Cross-Border Credit Flows 
 Dependent Variable 
 BOOM (RAPID+SLOW) RAPID SLOW BUST 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Sample ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB NON-BB ALL BB 
GDPPCGR 0.1018** 0.1242* -0.2165 0.0489 0.0569 -0.2228* 0.0563 0.0386 0.0523 0.0161 0.0278 
 (0.039) (0.074) (0.287) (0.209) (0.206) (0.080) (0.196) (0.493) (0.693) (0.676) (0.445) 
M2GRREAL 0.0092 0.0130 -0.0332 0.0070 0.0066 -0.0644 -0.0034 -0.0012 -0.0086 -0.0673*** -0.0603*** 
 (0.317) (0.250) (0.351) (0.426) (0.505) (0.164) (0.715) (0.911) (0.819) (0.000) (0.000) 
CROSSBORDER 0.0599*** 0.0768*** 0.1378* 0.0228 0.0235 0.1330** 0.0693*** 0.0994*** -0.0050 -0.0350* -0.0565*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.076) (0.219) (0.299) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.922) (0.095) (0.006) 
POPGR 0.4495* 0.5902** -4.1528 0.4314** 0.5270*** -3.9322** 0.0379 0.0157 -1.2761 0.2924 0.1363 
 (0.057) (0.036) (0.184) (0.025) (0.009) (0.038) (0.850) (0.947) (0.411) (0.405) (0.619) 
AGEDEPYOUNG 0.0891** 0.1189** -2.5172*** 0.0516 0.0703** 0.2581* 0.0148 0.0343 -0.1284 -0.3496*** -0.2241** 
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.000) (0.117) (0.027) (0.076) (0.615) (0.358) (0.412) (0.000) (0.018) 
GROSSAVGDP 0.0637*** 0.0827*** -0.2362* 0.0146 0.0254 0.0318 0.0520*** 0.0622 0.1282** -0.0841*** -0.0358 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.095) (0.367) (0.245) (0.638) (0.003) (0.011)** (0.049) (0.007) (0.164) 
DOMCREPRIVSEC -0.0100*** -0.0124*** -0.2008*** -0.0104*** -0.0124*** 0.0291* 0.0020 0.0010 -0.0100 0.0236*** 0.0170*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.065) (0.409) (0.747) (0.508) (0.000) (0.002) 
CONSTANT -3.5923*** -4.7256*** 93.7903*** -1.7695** -2.2904** -9.2655** -3.2656*** -4.0923*** 0.7435 6.9823*** 4.1925** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.032) (0.013) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.863) (0.001) (0.037) 
SAMPLE SIZE 291 234 57 293 236 57 291 234 57 291 234 
GROUPS 26 21 5 26 21 5 26 21 5 26 21 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
-145.39*** -105.94*** -25.47*** -135.45*** -99.84*** -28.15 -119.36*** -86.97*** -26.51 -97.28*** -89.79*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.4207) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.4626) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
p-values are provided in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate statistical significance at the levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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B.Financial Development and Housing Price Cycles  
Financial sector has a vital role for economic development. According to both World 
Bank and OECD21 “Financial sector is the set of institutions, instruments, and markets. It also 
includes the legal and regulatory framework that permits transactions to be made through the 
extension of credit”. There are many studies suggesting that a strong and well-functioning 
financial sector helps economic growth and job creation. Hence, financial development has 
paved the way for economic development. Because of this, a good measurement of financial 
development is very important by evaluating the progress of financial development. But it is not 
easy to measure to measure financial development because the financial sector has been getting 
increase complexity.  
To measure financial development, it has been use different sets of indicators. The most 
comprehensive set of indicators has been prepared by Cihak et al. (2012). They have developed 
several measures four characteristics of financial markets and institutions in order to measure 
and benchmark financial systems; financial depth, financial stability, financial efficiency and 
financial access22; they have presented a 4x2 matrix of financial system characteristics (Cihak et 
al., 2013:9).  
By following Cihak et al. (2012), we use the set of indicators in 4x2 matrix of financial 
system to investigate the relationship between housing boom-bust cycles and financial 
development for 26 countries that we determine housing boom-bust cycles for these countries 
and group them into two categories (boom countries and boom-bust countries) in the first 
section of the paper as well GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). We also look at 
the correlation between housing boom-bust cycles and financial development for four different 
paces of housing price movements here, namely BOOM, RAPID, SLOW and BUST. 
Having built an overall understanding of the factors associated with housing price 
cycles, we have extended our analysis so as to take into consideration the measures of financial 
development. In that, we maintained a simple specification where BOOM, RAPID, SLOW and 
BUST are regressed against GDPPCGR, CROSSBORDER and one financial development 
measure23 at a time24. Results of this exercise are summarized in Table 5 for the whole sample 
and for the GIIPS countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The emphasis on 
                                                 
21 www.worldbank.org, www.oecd.org 
22 Financial access data have not been used as data are not available for all countries of interest. 
23 See Appendix A for metadata related to financial development measures considered. 
24 Using the same notation as in Section IV.A., we now use an equation of the form 
it it it it
Y x z u    , where 
it
Y  
is the binary dependent variable, 
it
x  is a matrix of macroeconomic determinants with its coefficient vector   (not 
reported in Table 5) and 
it
z  is the matrix of financial development variables with the corresponding coefficient 
vector  . 
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the GIIPS economies here originates from the apparent difficulties they experienced during the 
last five years. 
Table 5. Estimates with Financial Development Variables 
 
 
BOOM RAPID SLOW BUST 
  All GIIPS All GIIPS All GIIPS All GIIPS 
 FINANCIAL DEPTH 
 Financial Institutions 
1 PCDMBGDP -0.0095** -0.0256*** -0.0074*** -0.0183 0.0004 -0.0073 0.0196*** 0.0141*** 
2 PCDMBAFIGDP -0.0082** -0.0256*** -0.0062*** -0.0183 0.0003 -0.0073 0.0188*** 0.0141*** 
3 FSDGDP -0.0071* -0.0524*** -0.0050* -0.0521*** -0.0004 -0.0087 0.0321** 0.0356*** 
4 DMBAGDP -0.0088** -0.0285*** -0.0063*** -0.0252* 0.0002 -0.0078 0.0194*** 0.0173*** 
5 OFIAGDP -0.0056** NA -0.0038 NA -0.0010 NA 0.6890 NA 
6 DMBABA -0.0024 -0.3140** -0.0138 -0.0909 0.0180 -0.0466 0.0271 0.1102 
 Financial Markets 
7 SMCGDP 0.0012 -0.0045 -0.0035 -0.0004 0.0058*** 0.0023 0.0006 0.0029 
8 SMTVTGDP -0.0002 0.0050 -0.0021 0.0032 0.0025* 0.0026 0.0037* -0.0012 
9 PRIVBMCGDP -0.0036 -0.0127 -0.0022 -0.0082 0.0005 -0.0057 0.0134*** 0.0169** 
10 PUBBMCGDP 0.0081 0.0268** 0.0063 0.0179** 0.0024 0.0058 -0.0005 -0.0115 
11 IDUGDP -0.0085** -0.0531*** -0.0059** -0.0326** -0.0002 -0.0309* 0.0103*** 0.0228*** 
 FINANCIAL EFFICIENCY 
 Financial Institutions 
12 NIM -0.0992 0.7689* 0.0426 0.3869 -0.2355*** 0.0252 -0.0891 -0.6144* 
13 BCI 0.0267*** 0.0247 0.0215*** 0.0111 0.0109 0.0091 -0.0325*** -0.0220* 
14 BOCTA 0.0413 0.9886** 0.1276* 0.2947 -0.1437* 0.1205 -0.5893*** -0.8745*** 
 Financial Markets 
15 SMTR 0.0011 0.0046 -0.0018 0.0029 0.0040** 0.0036 0.0035 -0.0023 
 FINANCIAL STABILITY 
 Financial Institutions 
16 BZ 0.0190 0.0288 0.0188* 0.0217 0.0049 0.0033 -0.0698** -0.0372 
17 LLGDP -0.0090* -0.0508*** -0.0051** -0.0496*** -0.0022 -0.0091 0.0421*** 0.0327*** 
 OTHER 
18 BROA 0.0188 1.5893* 0.0402 1.1125** -0.0305 0.2937 -0.2504** -0.9181* 
19 BROE 0.0150 0.0518 0.0101 0.0394 0.0078 0.0018 -0.0198** -0.0299 
All and GIIPS indicate the whole sample and the GIIPS sub-sample, respectively. (***), (**) and (*) indicate statistical 
significance at the levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent (also shown in shades), respectively. Model details and p-values are not 
provided for visual ease and they are available from authors upon request. 
While elaborating the findings of Table 5, we follow the original grouping of financial 
development indicators due to Cihak et al. (2012) and consider four categories, namely financial 
depth, financial efficiency, financial stability and others. Whenever possible, we extend our 
discussion so as to make separate references to financial institutions and financial markets. Such 
an approach, we believe, provides us with a better understanding of the underlying economic 
story. 
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Financial Depth 
Financial depth is one of the indicators of financial development in an economy. It 
shows the size of the financial sector (e.g. size of banks, other financial institutions, and 
financial markets) relative to the economy.25 If a country has well‐developed financial system, 
its financial system is deep and provides the economy with adequate credit and other financial 
services. 
In this paper to measure financial depth for financial institutions,  we take the ratio of 
private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (PCDMBAFIGDP),  and the ratio of assets to 
(for both deposit banks and other financial institutions) GDP. While measuring financial depth 
for financial markets, we focus on the two main segments of the financial markets (i.e. the size 
of stock markets and bond markets). Thus as a measure of depth of financial markets, the 
financial variables that we consider are the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
(SMCGDP), stock market total value traded to GDP (SMTVTGDP) and  private as well as 
public bond market capitalization to GDP (PRIVBMCGDP and PUBMCGDP).  
Having a look at the association of financial depth indicators related to financial 
institutions with our episodes, it is seen that the Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks to GDP 
ratio has a negative association with BOOM and RAPID episodes and a positive association 
with BUST episodes (Row 1). The same is valid when we consider the private credit provided 
by other financial institutions in relation to GDP (Row 2), financial system deposits to GDP 
ratio (Row 3) and deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio (Row 4). Findings about the other 
financial institutions’ assets to GDP ratio26 (Row 5) and deposit money bank assets to bank 
assets ratio (Row 6) are congruent with these observations, yet they lack statistical significance. 
Hence, there is a clear-cut association between housing price episodes and depth indicators of 
financial institutions. The observation that price increases (decreases) in housing sector are 
negatively (positively) related to depth of financial institutions is indicative of the stabilizing, or 
correcting, role of more developed financial institutions on housing prices. In other words, the 
deeper the markets with respect to financial institutions, the smaller the house price movements 
are; i.e. a large sale of housing will not move the housing prices much. 
The same picture, nevertheless, is not valid in the case of the depth of stock markets. As 
compared to depth of financial institutions, which yielded a clear-cut conclusion, the evidence 
in the case of stock market depth is mixed. Here, the stock market capitalization in relation to 
GDP (Row 7) has a significant and positive sign in the case of SLOW episodes in the whole 
sample; whereas the stock market total value traded to GDP ratio is positively associated with 
SLOW and BUST episodes and in the whole sample only (Row 8). Such lack of a strong 
                                                 
25 See.www.econ.worldbank.org 
26 For this variable, the likelihood function turned out to be non-convergent in the GIIPS sub-sample. 
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association between these indicators and housing price episodes are not surprising though, since 
bank finance, rather than equity finance, is the dominant mode of finance in Europe. 
Turning our attention to bond issues by private and public sectors and to international 
debt issues, interesting findings come out. Having a look at the capitalization of bond market in 
relation to GDP, it is observed that private bond market capitalization has a positive linkage 
with the BUST episodes for both the whole sample and the GIIPS sub-sample (Row 9). Public 
bond market capitalization, on the other hand, is positively linked to BOOM and RAPID 
episodes in the case of GIIPS economies only (Row 10). 
It is viable that declining housing prices (BUST) causes a decline in housing supply, 
suppresses the collateral values of mortgages, hence jeopardizing the receivables of private 
institutions. A higher capitalization of private bond market in relation to GDP is then likely to 
follow such financing difficulties (Row 9). The case of the public bond market, on the other 
hand, calls for a different story. We know that loose fiscal policy, high public debt and the 
associated roll-over requirements induced higher wage increases in GIIPS economies than EU 
average. These developments resulted in elevation of purchasing power and expansion of 
consumption demand especially directed toward durables/housing. The positive association 
between public bond market capitalization and BOOM/RAPID episodes in GIIPS economies 
(Row 10) can be seen as a direct consequence. 
Finally, international debt issues to GDP ratio (Row 11) has a negative association with 
the BOOM and RAPID episodes and a positive association with the BUST episodes. This 
observation is valid for the whole sample as well as the GIIPS economies. As the ability to issue 
international debt helps economies to extend their average debt maturity, it might have a 
tranquilizing effect on housing prices, i.e. decreasing the probability of a housing price increase 
(BOOM) and increasing the probability of a housing price decrease (BUST). 
Financial Efficiency” 
In an ideally efficient banking system, lower bank cost-to-income and bank overhead 
costs to total assets ratios are expected. These two, indeed, boil down to a narrower net interest 
margin, i.e. a smaller difference between the lending and borrowing rates. In Table 5, net 
interest margin (Row 12) has a significant positive relationship with the likelihood of a BOOM 
(GIIPS sub-sample), a significant negative relationship with the likelihood of SLOW episodes 
(whole sample) and a strong negative association with the likelihood of BUST episodes (GIIPS 
sub-sample). This lends support to the view that financers had to operate within wider interest 
margins in order to overcome various costs they faced. In parallel with this finding, bank 
overhead costs in relation to their total assets (Row 14) have a positive linkage with BOOM and 
RAPID episodes where the coefficient estimate for the former is significant in the case of GIIPS 
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economies and for the latter in the case of whole sample. As to BUST episodes a strongly 
negative relationship between overhead costs and the likelihood of a BUST has been estimated. 
The stock market turnover ratio (Row 15); however, does not suggest any strong pattern 
of relationships, except that it is positively associated with SLOW episodes in the whole 
sample. Dominance of bank rather than equity finance can be seen as the main driver of this 
finding again.  
Financial Stability 
Bank z-score (Row 16) is positively associated with RAPID episodes and negatively 
associated with BUST episodes in the whole sample. This indicator does not display any 
significant relationships in the GIIPS sub-sample. The positive linkage of z-score to RAPID 
episodes is quite intuitive, as more attractive and stable rates of return accompanied, or resulted 
from, the fast upward trend of housing prices in the earlier phase of BOOMs. In that, the 
disappearance of the relationship between bank z-scores and housing prices in SLOW episodes 
is also meaningful and it might be read as a signal of satiation for returns once the RAPID phase 
of booms has been over. As bank returns fall and volatility of returns increase during BUSTS, 
the negative association of z-scores and the likelihood of BUST episodes is intuitive, as well. 
Ratio of the liquid liabilities to GDP (or M3/GDP, Row 17) display a significant 
negative association with BOOM and RAPID episodes and significant positive association with 
BUST episodes, for both the whole sample and GIIPS economies. It must be noted that this is 
the only counter-intuitive finding among all, as higher liquidity is supposed to have fuelled the 
fast increase of house prices in the first half of the last decade. 
Other Indicators 
Banks’ return on assets and on equity (Row 18 and 19) are positively associated with 
BOOM and RAPID episodes and negatively associated with the BUST episodes. Return on 
assets has a significant positive sign in the cases of BOOM and RAPID and a significant 
negative sign in the case of BUST for the whole sample as well as the GIIPS sub-sample. 
Return on equity has a significant negative linkage only with the BUST episodes in the whole 
sample. These findings agree with the aggressive credit expansion and net worth building by 
banks during the sustained hike of house prices. Although the return on assets and return on 
equity remain outside of the dataset due to Cihak et al. (2012), they are included in the analysis 
owing to their high relevance. 
V.Conclusion 
Economic dynamics related to housing sector gained an ever high visibility during and 
in the aftermath of the latest global financial crisis. Owing to high income multiplier in the 
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construction sector and capability of housing sector to mobilize tremendous volume of credits as 
well as stock market transactions, the recent boom-bust experience in housing sector resulted in 
the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression. Having appeared initially in the second 
half of 2007, the global crisis was officially declared in 2008. The following years, then, 
witnessed a deep global recession, persistently high unemployment rates and unsuccessful 
public sector action. It is then evident that asset price busts affect the economies adversely over 
many dimensions, as was earlier reported by IMF (2003). So we focus on the formation 
(BOOM) and dissolution (BUST) of asset price bubbles and analyze the factors associated with 
them using a slightly different perspective than that of the recent literature. 
Regarding the erratic behavior of asset prices a number of alternative terms were coined 
earlier, among which bubble, boom, panic, burst, crash and irrational exuberance have utmost 
popularity. These terms commonly define a period in which housing price exceeds its 
fundamental value as a boom or bubble. In this study, we also share this common 
conceptualization of erratic movements of asset prices. Our numerical approach, though, differs 
from those in existing literature as (1) we use a simple and transparent methodology, which is 
nothing but a judgmentally augmented version of Ball (1994), to identify the turning points of 
housing price cycles and to sub-divide the boom periods with respect to pace of price increases 
as rapid and slow, (2) this is the first paper that relates housing boom-bust cycles to financial 
development. Note that, in an attempt to understand what has happened in the case of the most 
problematic economies, we developed our analysis regarding financial development in a way to 
treat GIIPS economies separately. 
Using quarterly data from 1995Q1-2013Q3 for 28 countries we identify the housing 
price cycles and categorize our sample countries as boom countries and boom-bust countries. 
Then, we use a panel probit approach to reveal the factors associated with housing price booms 
and busts from 2000 to 2012 (on an annual data basis) for 26 countries for which at least a boom 
period has been identified. 
All in all, our findings point at the broad and intuitive observation that both 
macroeconomic factors and the level of financial development are important in the formation as 
well as dissolution of housing price booms. At a glance, these are of an expected nature, i.e. 
increases in economic activity, liquidity, population or cross-border capital flows must be 
positively associated with boom periods. In the financial development front, we can highlight 
(1) financial institutions’ depth has a stabilizing or correcting role, whereas the same is not valid 
in the case of stock market depth, as bank finance, rather than equity finance, represents the 
dominant mode of finance in Europe. In other words, large sales of housing will not move the 
housing prices much, (2) public bond market capitalization has been revealed to be de-
stabilizing in the case of GIIPS economies, where (3) financial efficiency, financial stability and 
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other measures of interest have their expected signs. The higher the financial efficiency and 
financial stability are, the less volatile are the housing price movements. 
On the reverse side of the coin, it is revealed that some of the reported relationships 
which are valid for boom periods as a whole are not preserved for the periods with rapid and 
slow increase in housing prices. A similar observation holds for the GIIPS versus non-GIIPS 
sub-samples in our analysis of financial development, where some relationships have been 
revealed for the sample of all countries, some relationships are underlined in the case of GIIPS 
economies only. Therefore, it is quite possible to obtain some generally acceptable conclusions 
as to the factors associated with housing price cycles. Yet it is hard to reach a characterization of 
housing price cycles which is valid for every different period and/or different group of 
countries; a conclusion which by itself poses further questions. These questions, indeed, are left 
as part of our future research agenda. 
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Appendix A: Data Sources and Definitions 
Data sources and metadata are given below in Table A1. Consumer prices are obtained at monthly 
frequency and transformed to quarterly frequency as average of observations in order to ensure 
compatibility with house prices. Each macroeconomic or institutional indicator was compiled from the 
same source whenever possible. 
Table A1.Data Sources and Definitions 
House Prices and Consumer Prices 
Austria Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.AT.N.TD.00.3.00, Residential property prices, New and existing dwellings, Whole country, ECB, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.AT.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Belgium Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.BE.N.ED.00.2.00, Residential property prices, Existing dwellings, Whole country, NCB, Residential property 
in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.BE.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Bulgaria Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.BG.N.EF.LC.1.00, Residential property prices, Existing flats, Large cities, NSI, Residential property in good 
and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A), [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.BG.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Cyprus Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.CY.N.TD.00.2.00, Residential property prices, New and existing dwellings, Whole country, NCB, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.CY.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Czech Republic Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.CZ.N.EF.00.1.00, Residential property prices, Existing flats, Whole country, NSI, Residential property in 
good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100]; Eurostat 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.CZ.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Denmark Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.DK.N.TH.00.1.00, Residential property prices, New and existing houses, Whole country, NSI, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.DK.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Estonia Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.EE.N.TF.00.1.00, Residential property prices, New and existing flats, Whole country, NSI, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100]; National Statistics Office 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.EE.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Finland Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.FI.N.ED.00.3.00, Residential property prices, Existing dwellings, Whole country, ECB, Residential property 
in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.FI.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
France Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.FR.N.ED.00.1.00, Residential property prices, Existing dwellings, Whole country, NSI, Residential property 
in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.FR.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Germany Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.DE.N.TH.00.5.00, Residential property prices, New and existing houses, Whole country, Other, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100]; Bundesbank 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.DE.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Greece Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.GR.N.TF.00.3.00, Residential property prices, New and existing flats, Whole country, ECB, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.GR.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Hungary Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.HU.N.ED.CC.1.00, Residential property prices, Existing dwellings, Capital city, NSI, Residential property in 
good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100]; FHB Bank 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.HU.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Iceland Nominal house prices: National Statistics Office, Residential property market price index from 2000 
 Consumer prices: National Statistics Office, Consumer price index from 1939 [1988=100] 
Ireland Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.IE.N.TD.00.3.00, Residential property prices, New and existing dwellings, Whole country, ECB, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.IE.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Italy Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.IT.N.TD.00.2.00, Residential property prices, New and existing dwellings, Whole country, NCB, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.IT.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Latvia Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.LV.N.TF.00.2.00, Residential property prices, New and existing flats, Whole country, NCB, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.LV.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Lithuania Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.LT.N.TD.00.2.00, Residential property prices, New and existing dwellings, Whole country, NCB, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.LT.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Luxembourg Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.LU.N.TF.00.1.00, Residential property prices, New and existing flats, Whole country, NSI, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.LU.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
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Table A1.Data Sources and Definitions (continued) 
Malta Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.MT.N.TD.00.2.00, Residential property prices, New and existing dwellings, Whole country, NCB, 
Residential property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.MT.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Netherlands Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.NL.N.ED.00.1.00, Residential property prices, Existing dwellings, Whole country, NSI, Residential property 
in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.NL.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Norway Nominal house prices: National Statistics Office, House price index [2005=100] 
 Consumer prices: National Statistics Office, Consumer Price Index [1998=100] 
Portugal Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.PT.N.TD.00.5.00, Residential property prices, New and existing dwellings, Whole country, Other, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.PT.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Slovakia Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.SK.N.ED.00.2.00, Residential property prices, Existing dwellings, Whole country, NCB, Residential property 
in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.SK.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Slovenia Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.SLOW.N.ED.00.1.00, Residential property prices, Existing dwellings, Whole country, NSI, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.SLOW.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Spain Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.ES.N.TD.00.3.00, Residential property prices, New and existing dwellings, Whole country, ECB, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.ES.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
Sweden Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.SE.N.ED.00.1.00, Residential property prices, Existing dwellings, Whole country, NSI, Residential property 
in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.SE.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
UK Nominal house prices: ECB: RPP.Q.GB.N.TD.00.3.00, Residential property prices, New and existing dwellings, Whole country, ECB, Residential 
property in good and poor condition, Average of observations through period (A) [2007=100] 
 Consumer prices: Eurostat: ICP.M.GB.N.000000.4.INX, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted 
US Nominal house prices: FRED: USSTHPI 
 Consumer prices: FRED: CPIAUCSL 
Macroeconomic and Financial Variables  
GDPPCGR Annual growth rate of GDP per capita (%) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
M2GRREAL Annual growth rate of real M2 aggregate of money (%) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators, Authors’ calculations 
POPGR Annual growth rate of population (%) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
AGEDEPYOUNG Age dependency ratio for young population (%) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
GROSSAVGDP Ratio of gross savings to GDP (%) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
DOMCREPRIVSEC Ratio of domestic credit extended to private sector to GDP (%) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
VIX Global risk appetite (%, average) 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, implied volatility of S&P 500 index options 
CROSSBORDER Annual growth rate of cross-border credit flows (world, %, average) 
IMF, International Financial Statistics, BIS, Bank of International Settlements, BIS calculations 
Unless otherwise specified, the following have been taken from the World Bank, The Global Financial Development Database. 
See Cihak et al. (2012) for detailed descriptions of data items. 
PCDMBGDP Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) 
PCDMBAFIGDP Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (%) 
FSDGDP Financial system deposits to GDP (%) 
DMBAGDP Deposit money bank assets to GDP (%) 
OFIAGDP Other financial institutions assets to GDP (%) 
DMBABA Deposit money bank assets to (deposit money + central) bank assets (%) 
SMCGDP Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 
SMTVTGDP Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 
PRIVBMCGDP Private bond market capitalization to GDP (%) 
PUBBMCGDP Public bond market capitalization to GDP (%) 
IDUGDP International debt issues to GDP (%) 
NIM Net interest margin (%) 
BCI Bank cost to income ratio (%) 
BOCTA Bank overhead costs to total assets (%) 
SMTR Stock market turnover ratio (%) 
BZ Bank z-score 
LLGDP Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 
BROA Bank ROA 
BROE Bank ROE 
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Appendix B: Real House Price Episodes – Tabular Presentation 
A full list of the house price episodes is given below in Table B1. In each row, start and end dates are 
given with the corresponding values of real house prices and trend inflation (left panel). Total and episode 
average changes in prices and trend inflation are also displayed (right panel). RAPID, SLOW, BUST, 
SLOWFALL and RAPIDFALL denote the pace of change of real house prices (RAPID: rapidly 
increasing, SLOW: slowly increasing, BUST: falling, RAPIDFALL: rapidly falling, SLOWFALL: slowly 
falling). Asterisks on start dates indicate use of judgment in determining the corresponding episodes. Note 
that, in our analysis, RAPID and SLOW are together called BOOM. 
Table B1. Real House Price Episodes 
          
Changes in 
  
Dates 
Prices 
(Index value) 
Trend housing 
price 
(%) 
  
Prices 
(%) 
Trend housing 
price 
(percentage points) 
 
Type Start End Start End Start End 
 
Duration  
(quarters) 
Total 
Average 
(Per 
quarter) 
Total Average 
Austria RAPID 2004Q3* 2006Q1 95.8 104.4 0.33 1.76 
 
7 8.98 1.50 1.44 0.24 
 
RAPID 2007Q3 2010Q1 109.8 121.2 0.23 1.67 
 
11 10.37 1.04 1.44 0.14 
 
SLOW 2010Q2 2013Q2 123.3 156.9 1.36 0.00 
 
13 27.25 2.27 -1.36 -0.11 
Belgium SLOW 1997Q2 1999Q3 66.0 74.7 0.71 1.06 
 
10 13.21 1.47 0.35 0.04 
 
RAPID 2001Q1 2005Q2 77.1 99.0 0.38 2.54 
 
18 28.44 1.67 2.15 0.13 
 
SLOW 2005Q3 2007Q3 101.2 118.8 2.46 1.13 
 
9 17.49 2.19 -1.33 -0.17 
Bulgaria RAPID 2002Q1* 2004Q2 49.9 73.2 -0.61 8.85 
 
10 46.81 5.20 9.46 1.05 
 
SLOW 2004Q3 2005Q4 81.2 101.6 8.38 2.60 
 
6 25.24 5.05 -5.78 -1.16 
 
RAPID 2006Q1 2007Q2 103.1 125.8 2.06 4.48 
 
6 22.07 4.41 2.42 0.48 
 
SLOW 2007Q3 2008Q2 129.4 146.0 4.43 -0.20 
 
4 12.89 4.30 -4.62 -1.54 
 
BUST 2008Q3 2013Q3 145.7 80.9 -2.01 0.00 
 
21 -44.48 -2.22 2.01 0.10 
 
RAPIDFALL (2008Q3) 2009Q2 145.70 110.57 -2.01 -5.32 
 
4 -24.11 -8.04 -3.31 -1.10 
 
SLOWFALL (2009Q3*) 2012Q1 104.04 84.11 -5.58 -1.43 
 
11 -19.16 -1.92 4.15 0.41 
 
RAPIDFALL (2012Q2) 2013Q3 83.68 80.89 -1.16 0.00 
 
6 -3.33 -0.67 1.16 0.23 
Cyprus RAPID 2005Q1 2007Q2 97.8 132.6 1.89 4.63 
 
10 35.61 3.96 2.73 0.30 
 
SLOW 2007Q3 2008Q2 137.0 151.0 4.32 1.16 
 
4 10.23 3.41 -3.16 -1.05 
 
BUST 2008Q3 2013Q2 150.6 109.9 0.47 0.00 
 
20 -27.00 -1.42 -0.47 -0.02 
 
RAPIDFALL (2008Q3) 2009Q2 150.61 141.02 0.47 -1.06 
 
4 -6.37 -2.12 -1.52 -0.51 
 
SLOWFALL (2009Q3) 2010Q1 143.15 140.11 -1.19 -0.89 
 
3 -2.12 -1.06 0.30 0.15 
 
RAPIDFALL (2010Q2) 2013Q2 138.44 109.95 -0.99 0.00 
 
13 -20.58 -1.71 0.99 0.08 
Czech Republic RAPID 2005Q4* 2007Q3 100.3 139.3 0.84 5.19 
 
8 38.85 5.55 4.34 0.62 
 
SLOW 2007Q4 2008Q3 141.6 152.5 4.40 -1.07 
 
4 7.71 2.57 -5.47 -1.82 
 
BUST 2008Q4 2013Q2 149.4 111.0 -1.51 0.00 
 
19 -25.71 -1.43 1.51 0.08 
 
RAPIDFALL (2008Q4) 2009Q2 149.38 128.38 -1.51 -2.64 
 
3 -14.06 -7.03 -1.13 -0.57 
 
SLOWFALL (2009Q3) 2010Q4 126.46 119.82 -3.02 -0.76 
 
6 -5.25 -1.05 2.26 0.45 
 
SLOWFALL (2011Q2) 2011Q4 119.39 116.37 -1.00 -0.83 
 
3 -2.53 -1.26 0.16 0.08 
 
RAPIDFALL (2012Q1) 2013Q2 114.37 110.98 -0.89 0.00 
 
6 -2.96 -0.59 0.89 0.18 
Denmark RAPID 1995Q1* 1997Q3 52.6 65.5 
 
2.25 
 
11 24.55 2.46 2.25 0.22 
 
SLOW 1997Q4 2001Q1 66.1 78.3 1.88 0.82 
 
14 18.32 1.41 -1.06 -0.08 
 
RAPID 2002Q2 2005Q3 79.3 101.6 0.16 4.51 
 
14 28.16 2.17 4.35 0.33 
 
SLOW 2005Q4 2007Q1 108.3 123.8 4.36 0.82 
 
6 14.31 2.86 -3.54 -0.71 
 
BUST 2007Q2 2013Q2 123.0 90.6 -0.05 0.00 
 
25 -26.35 -1.10 0.05 0.00 
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Table B1. Real House Price Episodes (continued) 
          
Changes in 
  
Dates 
Prices 
(Index value) 
Trend housing 
price 
(%) 
  
Prices 
(%) 
Trend housing 
price 
(percentage points) 
 
Type Start End Start End Start End 
 
Duration  
(quarters) 
Total 
Average 
(Per 
quarter) 
Total Average 
Denmark RAPIDFALL (2007Q2) 2008Q2 122.97 116.52 -0.05 -2.96 
 
5 -5.24 -1.31 -2.91 -0.73 
 
SLOWFALL (2008Q3) 2010Q1 112.47 99.05 -3.26 -0.03 
 
7 -11.93 -1.99 3.23 0.54 
 
RAPIDFALL (2010Q2) 2013Q2 99.11 90.56 -0.07 0.00 
 
13 -8.62 -0.72 0.07 0.01 
Estonia RAPID 2003Q3 2006Q1 61.9 130.8 2.95 8.61 
 
11 111.36 11.14 5.66 0.57 
 
SLOW 2006Q2 2007Q1 136.2 160.9 7.71 1.03 
 
4 18.13 6.04 -6.68 -2.23 
 
BUST 2007Q2 2009Q4 160.1 74.3 -0.41 -4.55 
 
11 -53.62 -5.36 -4.14 -0.41 
 
RAPIDFALL (2007Q2) 2008Q2 160.09 127.26 -0.41 -8.90 
 
5 -20.50 -5.13 -8.49 -2.12 
 
SLOWFALL (2008Q3) 2009Q4 114.22 74.26 -9.04 -4.55 
 
6 -34.99 -7.00 4.50 0.90 
Finland RAPID 1996Q1* 1997Q1 56.3 66.5 1.20 3.35 
 
5 18.26 4.56 2.15 0.54 
 
SLOW 1997Q2 2000Q3 68.3 82.6 3.27 -0.27 
 
14 20.90 1.61 -3.54 -0.27 
 
SLOW 2002Q1 2004Q2 82.5 95.3 0.93 1.53 
 
10 15.55 1.73 0.60 0.07 
 
RAPID 2005Q2 2006Q1 99.0 104.6 1.34 1.58 
 
4 5.64 1.88 0.24 0.08 
France RAPID 1998Q1* 1999Q4 55.2 60.8 0.58 1.74 
 
8 10.26 1.47 1.16 0.17 
 
SLOW 2000Q1 2001Q1 62.1 66.0 1.51 1.45 
 
5 6.26 1.56 -0.06 -0.01 
 
RAPID 2001Q2 2004Q4 66.8 92.5 1.37 3.17 
 
15 38.41 2.74 1.80 0.13 
 
SLOW 2005Q1 2007Q4 95.6 116.2 3.06 -0.09 
 
12 21.57 1.96 -3.16 -0.29 
 
BUST 2008Q1 2009Q3 115.5 103.8 -0.61 -0.59 
 
7 -10.09 -1.68 0.02 0.00 
 
RAPIDFALL (2008Q1) 2008Q3 115.47 112.06 -0.61 -1.50 
 
3 -2.95 -1.48 -0.89 -0.44 
 
SLOWFALL (2008Q4) 2009Q3 109.49 103.82 -1.59 -0.59 
 
4 -5.19 -1.73 1.00 0.33 
Germany BUST 2001Q1 2002Q2 105.1 101.7 -0.52 -0.56 
 
6 -3.23 -0.65 -0.04 -0.01 
 
SLOW 2012Q4 2013Q3 96.4 97.9 0.42 0.00 
 
4 1.58 0.53 -0.42 -0.14 
Greece SLOW 1997Q1 1999Q1 59.4 69.1 
 
1.61 
 
9 16.32 2.04 1.61 0.20 
 
RAPID 1999Q2 2001Q3 70.3 85.2 1.60 2.66 
 
10 21.20 2.36 1.06 0.12 
 
SLOW 2001Q4 2003Q1 86.6 94.5 2.45 0.78 
 
6 9.17 1.83 -1.66 -0.33 
 
RAPID 2003Q4 2006Q1 94.1 106.6 -0.08 2.30 
 
10 13.26 1.47 2.38 0.26 
 
SLOW 2006Q2 2006Q4 108.7 113.3 1.85 1.38 
 
3 4.24 2.12 -0.47 -0.23 
 
BUST 2007Q1 2013Q3 112.5 68.6 0.72 0.00 
 
27 -39.01 -1.50 -0.72 -0.03 
 
RAPIDFALL (2007Q1) 2009Q3 112.53 103.62 0.72 -1.87 
 
11 -7.92 -0.79 -2.59 -0.26 
 
SLOWFALL (2009Q4*) 2012Q1 102.96 79.90 -2.27 -3.24 
 
10 -22.40 -2.49 -0.97 -0.11 
 
RAPIDFALL (2012Q2) 2013Q3 78.05 68.63 -3.17 0.00 
 
6 -12.07 -2.41 3.17 0.63 
Hungary RAPID 1998Q3* 2000Q1 49.3 70.6 
 
6.55 
 
7 43.06 7.18 6.55 1.09 
 
RAPID 2001Q3 2003Q1 80.7 96.1 1.77 3.07 
 
7 19.13 3.19 1.30 0.22 
 
SLOW 2003Q2 2003Q4 99.2 104.2 1.85 1.59 
 
3 5.03 2.52 -0.27 -0.13 
 
BUST 2008Q1 2012Q2 96.0 63.0 -0.91 0.00 
 
18 -34.32 -2.02 0.91 0.05 
 
RAPIDFALL (2008Q1) 2008Q4 96.00 92.49 -0.91 -2.60 
 
4 -3.65 -1.22 -1.69 -0.56 
 
SLOWFALL (2009Q1) 2010Q4 88.86 75.20 -2.84 -1.19 
 
8 -15.38 -2.20 1.64 0.23 
 
RAPIDFALL (2011Q1) 2012Q2 73.65 63.05 -2.19 0.00 
 
6 -14.39 -2.88 2.19 0.44 
Iceland RAPID 2001Q4* 2002Q4 68.2 70.8 -0.26 1.77 
 
5 3.80 0.95 2.02 0.51 
 
SLOW 2003Q1 2004Q1 72.9 78.3 1.98 2.13 
 
5 7.47 1.87 0.15 0.04 
 
RAPID 2004Q2* 2005Q2 79.5 98.7 2.82 4.83 
 
5 24.14 6.04 2.00 0.50 
 
SLOW 2005Q3 2006Q1 103.7 110.4 4.42 2.77 
 
3 6.45 3.23 -1.64 -0.82 
 
BUST 2007Q4 2010Q1 118.0 80.2 -0.39 -2.20 
 
10 -32.05 -3.56 -1.81 -0.20 
 
RAPIDFALL (2007Q4) 2008Q3 118.03 105.55 -0.39 -3.84 
 
4 -10.58 -3.53 -3.45 -1.15 
 
SLOWFALL (2008Q4*) 2010Q1 98.66 80.20 -4.85 -2.20 
 
6 -18.71 -3.74 2.65 0.53 
Ireland RAPID 1995Q3* 1997Q4 35.9 45.5 
 
5.03 
 
10 26.60 2.96 5.03 0.56 
 
SLOW 1998Q1 2001Q1 47.7 78.0 4.75 1.59 
 
13 63.36 5.28 -3.16 -0.26 
 
RAPID 2002Q1 2003Q2 76.5 86.2 0.76 2.43 
 
6 12.81 2.56 1.68 0.34 
 
SLOW 2003Q3 2004Q3 87.7 95.8 2.33 1.66 
 
5 9.26 2.31 -0.68 -0.17 
 
RAPID 2004Q4 2006Q2 95.8 109.5 1.53 2.70 
 
7 14.32 2.39 1.17 0.19 
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Table B1. Real House Price Episodes (continued) 
          
Changes in 
  
Dates 
Prices 
(Index value) 
Trend housing 
price 
(%) 
  
Prices 
(%) 
Trend housing 
price 
(percentage points) 
 
Type Start End Start End Start End 
 
Duration  
(quarters) 
Total 
Average 
(Per 
quarter) 
Total Average 
Ireland SLOW 2006Q3 2007Q2 114.0 118.8 2.43 0.48 
 
4 4.20 1.40 -1.95 -0.65 
 
BUST 2007Q3 2012Q2 117.5 57.6 -0.54 -2.80 
 
20 -50.95 -2.68 -2.26 -0.12 
 
RAPIDFALL (2007Q3) 2008Q4 117.49 100.92 -0.54 -4.09 
 
6 -14.10 -2.82 -3.55 -0.71 
 
SLOWFALL (2009Q1) 2010Q3 95.98 77.48 -4.16 -3.08 
 
7 -19.28 -3.21 1.08 0.18 
 
RAPIDFALL (2010Q4) 2012Q2 75.12 57.63 -3.33 -2.80 
 
7 -23.28 -3.88 0.54 0.09 
Italy RAPID 1999Q1* 2002Q2 77.5 88.6 0.00 1.77 
 
14 14.38 1.11 1.77 0.14 
 
RAPID 2003Q2 2005Q1 91.0 98.5 0.66 1.27 
 
8 8.24 1.18 0.61 0.09 
 
SLOW 2005Q2 2008Q1 99.6 106.4 1.18 -0.21 
 
12 6.91 0.63 -1.38 -0.13 
 
BUST 2008Q2 2013Q2 106.2 87.7 -0.15 0.00 
 
21 -17.39 -0.87 0.15 0.01 
 
RAPIDFALL (2008Q2) 2009Q4 106.22 103.52 -0.15 -0.46 
 
7 -2.54 -0.42 -0.31 -0.05 
 
SLOWFALL (2010Q1*) 2011Q4 102.00 97.68 -0.60 -1.26 
 
8 -4.23 -0.60 -0.66 -0.09 
 
RAPIDFALL (2012Q1) 2013Q2 96.63 87.75 -1.49 0.00 
 
6 -9.19 -1.84 1.49 0.30 
Latvia RAPID 2001Q4* 2002Q4 35.4 78.0 9.78 14.50 
 
5 120.16 30.04 4.72 1.18 
 
RAPID 2003Q4 2006Q3 83.7 169.5 0.82 11.69 
 
12 102.54 9.32 10.87 0.99 
 
SLOW 2006Q4 2007Q3 187.1 217.4 10.35 0.75 
 
4 16.22 5.41 -9.59 -3.20 
 
BUST 2007Q4 2009Q3 199.9 86.6 -2.21 -7.90 
 
8 -56.66 -8.09 -5.69 -0.81 
 
RAPIDFALL (2007Q4) 2008Q2 199.90 175.48 -2.21 -9.07 
 
3 -12.22 -6.11 -6.86 -3.43 
 
SLOWFALL (2008Q3) 2009Q3 157.20 86.64 -11.61 -7.90 
 
5 -44.89 -11.22 3.71 0.93 
Lithuania RAPID 2002Q4 2005Q1 53.1 87.8 2.59 10.70 
 
10 65.55 7.28 8.11 0.90 
 
SLOW 2005Q2 2007Q3 91.8 183.7 10.55 4.62 
 
10 100.03 11.11 -5.93 -0.66 
 
BUST 2008Q2 2010Q3 184.5 97.3 -4.27 -2.02 
 
10 -47.24 -5.25 2.25 0.25 
 
RAPIDFALL (2008Q2) 2009Q1 184.45 127.88 -4.27 -7.31 
 
4 -30.67 -10.22 -3.04 -1.01 
 
SLOWFALL (2009Q2) 2010Q3 116.16 97.32 -8.01 -2.02 
 
6 -16.22 -3.24 5.99 1.20 
Luxembourg SLOW 2012Q2 2013Q2 101.3 104.7 0.44 0.00 
 
5 3.36 0.84 -0.44 -0.11 
Malta RAPID 2001Q4* 2004Q2 68.2 96.8 0.79 4.45 
 
11 42.00 4.20 3.66 0.37 
 
BUST 2007Q4 2009Q1 99.0 85.5 -1.31 -1.40 
 
6 -13.64 -2.73 -0.08 -0.02 
 
RAPIDFALL (2007Q4) 2008Q1 98.95 98.18 -1.31 -1.92 
 
2 -0.78 -0.78 -0.61 -0.61 
 
SLOWFALL (2008Q2) 2009Q1 96.27 85.45 -2.60 -1.40 
 
4 -11.23 -3.74 1.21 0.40 
Netherlands RAPID 1997Q3 1999Q3 60.7 76.3 2.17 3.69 
 
9 25.76 3.22 1.53 0.19 
 
SLOW 1999Q4 2008Q1 79.7 106.7 3.67 0.19 
 
34 33.85 1.03 -3.48 -0.11 
 
BUST 2008Q2 2013Q3 106.3 77.4 -0.11 0.00 
 
22 -27.15 -1.29 0.11 0.01 
 
RAPIDFALL (2008Q2) 2009Q3 106.25 100.79 -0.11 -0.93 
 
6 -5.14 -1.03 -0.83 -0.17 
 
SLOWFALL (2009Q4) 2010Q2 99.95 99.31 -0.96 -0.77 
 
3 -0.64 -0.32 0.19 0.10 
 
RAPIDFALL (2010Q3) 2013Q3 98.92 77.41 -0.81 0.00 
 
13 -21.75 -1.81 0.81 0.07 
Norway RAPID 1995Q1* 1997Q2 50.2 59.8 
 
2.53 
 
10 19.16 2.13 2.53 0.28 
 
RAPID 1998Q2 1999Q3 65.9 72.7 1.67 2.88 
 
6 10.23 2.05 1.20 0.24 
 
SLOW 1999Q4 2002Q2 76.0 87.1 2.84 0.30 
 
11 14.63 1.46 -2.54 -0.25 
 
RAPID 2002Q3 2006Q3 85.9 113.1 0.04 3.11 
 
17 31.70 1.98 3.07 0.19 
 
SLOW 2006Q4 2007Q3 116.9 125.6 2.93 1.09 
 
4 7.41 2.47 -1.84 -0.61 
 
RAPID 2010Q4 2011Q4 127.5 136.2 1.27 1.61 
 
5 6.77 1.69 0.34 0.08 
 
SLOW 2012Q1 2013Q2 137.7 144.5 1.35 0.00 
 
6 4.98 1.00 -1.35 -0.27 
Portugal RAPID 1996Q3* 1999Q3 90.8 102.4 0.03 1.54 
 
13 12.77 1.06 1.51 0.13 
 
SLOW 1999Q4 2001Q2 103.2 107.5 1.40 -0.01 
 
7 4.20 0.70 -1.41 -0.24 
 
BUST 2001Q3 2005Q1 107.0 99.0 -0.19 -0.11 
 
15 -7.47 -0.53 0.09 0.01 
 
BUST 2010Q2 2013Q3 101.1 88.3 -0.24 0.00 
 
14 -12.62 -0.97 0.24 0.02 
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Table B1. Real House Price Episodes (continued) 
          
Changes in 
  
Dates 
Prices 
(Index value) 
Trend housing 
price 
(%) 
  
Prices 
(%) 
Trend housing 
price 
(percentage 
points) 
 
Type Start End Start End Start End 
 
Duration  
(quarters) 
Total 
Average 
(Per 
quarter) 
Total Average 
Slovakia RAPID 2005Q2* 2007Q3 97.9 140.3 
 
5.51 
 
10 43.34 4.82 5.51 0.61 
 
SLOW 2007Q4 2008Q1 151.6 158.5 4.72 3.61 
 
2 4.53 4.53 -1.11 -1.11 
 
BUST 2008Q2 2012Q3 164.8 118.4 1.94 -0.74 
 
18 -28.14 -1.66 -2.68 -0.16 
 
RAPIDFALL (2008Q2) 2009Q1 164.79 148.23 1.94 -2.12 
 
4 -10.05 -3.35 -4.06 -1.35 
 
SLOWFALL (2009Q2) 2010Q3 141.30 134.51 -2.69 -1.23 
 
6 -4.81 -0.96 1.46 0.29 
 
RAPIDFALL (2010Q4) 2012Q3 131.67 118.41 -1.35 -0.74 
 
8 -10.07 -1.44 0.61 0.09 
Slovenia RAPID 2003Q1* 2006Q3 80.4 118.2 
 
4.54 
 
15 47.06 3.36 4.54 0.32 
 
SLOW 2006Q4 2007Q4 120.3 137.4 4.00 1.55 
 
5 14.18 3.55 -2.45 -0.61 
 
BUST 2008Q1 2009Q3 134.1 118.8 -0.29 -1.25 
 
7 -11.41 -1.90 -0.97 -0.16 
 
RAPIDFALL (2008Q1) 2008Q3 134.06 133.40 -0.29 -1.81 
 
3 -0.49 -0.25 -1.52 -0.76 
 
SLOWFALL (2008Q4*) 2009Q3 128.86 118.76 -2.04 -1.25 
 
4 -7.84 -2.61 0.79 0.26 
Spain RAPID 1997Q4* 1999Q1 50.5 54.6 0.91 1.67 
 
6 8.02 1.60 0.76 0.15 
 
RAPID 1999Q3 2003Q4 56.2 83.9 1.11 3.39 
 
18 49.34 2.90 2.28 0.13 
 
SLOW 2004Q1 2007Q3 86.8 112.1 3.38 -0.15 
 
15 29.14 2.08 -3.53 -0.25 
 
BUST 2007Q4 2013Q2 109.8 62.5 -0.72 0.00 
 
23 -43.13 -1.96 0.72 0.03 
 
RAPIDFALL (2007Q4) 2008Q2 109.84 105.72 -0.72 -1.51 
 
3 -3.75 -1.88 -0.79 -0.39 
 
SLOWFALL (2008Q3) 2010Q1 103.50 95.62 -1.86 -1.12 
 
7 -7.61 -1.27 0.75 0.12 
 
RAPIDFALL (2010Q2) 2013Q2 95.22 62.47 -1.42 0.00 
 
13 -34.39 -2.87 1.42 0.12 
Sweden RAPID 1996Q4* 1999Q3 56.2 69.0 0.88 2.33 
 
12 22.69 2.06 1.46 0.13 
 
SLOW 1999Q4 2001Q1 70.1 79.1 2.19 1.32 
 
6 12.86 2.57 -0.87 -0.17 
 
RAPID 2002Q1 2005Q2 79.7 98.7 0.92 2.37 
 
14 23.71 1.82 1.45 0.11 
 
SLOW 2005Q3 2007Q4 100.9 123.2 2.35 0.86 
 
10 22.19 2.47 -1.49 -0.17 
United Kingdom RAPID 1998Q2 1999Q2 47.7 49.6 0.71 2.12 
 
5 3.96 0.99 1.41 0.35 
 
SLOW 1999Q3 2000Q1 51.5 55.2 1.97 2.01 
 
3 7.10 3.55 0.04 0.02 
 
RAPID 2001Q1 2002Q1 56.3 64.7 1.60 4.68 
 
5 14.87 3.72 3.09 0.77 
 
SLOW 2002Q2 2004Q3 67.8 99.4 4.40 2.41 
 
10 46.67 5.19 -1.98 -0.22 
 
RAPID 2005Q3 2006Q3 100.1 105.7 0.85 1.87 
 
5 5.67 1.42 1.02 0.25 
 
SLOW 2006Q4 2007Q3 109.1 115.0 1.72 -0.27 
 
4 5.42 1.81 -1.99 -0.66 
 
BUST 2007Q4 2012Q4 112.7 78.4 -1.73 0.13 
 
21 -30.40 -1.52 1.86 0.09 
 
RAPIDFALL (2007Q4) 2008Q2 112.66 103.38 -1.73 -3.57 
 
3 -8.23 -4.11 -1.84 -0.92 
 
SLOWFALL (2008Q3) 2009Q2 96.14 86.42 -3.98 -2.00 
 
4 -10.11 -3.37 1.99 0.66 
United States SLOW 1996Q4 1998Q4 69.3 73.5 0.14 0.76 
 
9 6.03 0.75 0.63 0.08 
 
RAPID 1999Q1 2001Q4 73.9 81.7 0.64 1.22 
 
12 10.49 0.95 0.59 0.05 
 
SLOW 2002Q1 2002Q3 82.7 84.6 1.11 1.04 
 
3 2.33 1.17 -0.07 -0.03 
 
RAPID 2002Q4 2004Q3 85.2 94.5 0.97 1.89 
 
8 10.95 1.56 0.92 0.13 
 
SLOW 2004Q4 2006Q4 95.3 104.8 1.81 -0.04 
 
9 10.00 1.25 -1.85 -0.23 
 
BUST 2007Q1 2012Q4 103.9 76.6 -0.49 0.27 
 
24 -26.32 -1.14 0.76 0.03 
 
RAPIDFALL (2007Q1) 2007Q3 103.92 101.89 -0.49 -1.32 
 
3 -1.95 -0.97 -0.83 -0.41 
 
SLOWFALL (2007Q4) 2009Q3 99.65 87.20 -2.03 -1.06 
 
8 -12.49 -1.78 0.97 0.14 
 
RAPIDFALL (2009Q4) 2012Q4 85.27 76.56 -1.10 0.27 
 
13 -10.21 -0.85 1.37 0.11 
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Appendix C: Real House Price Episodes – Graphical Presentation 
The episodes of rapid increase (RAPID, shaded in red), slow increase (SLOW, shaded in yellow) and fall 
(BUST, shaded in blue) are displayed below for the countries in our sample. For each country, the upper 
and lower panels show the real house prices and the trend inflation of house prices used in Ball (1994) 
procedure, respectively. 
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Figure C1. Real House Price Episodes (continued) 
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Figure C1. Real House Price Episodes (continued) 
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Appendix D: Correlations Among Variables 
Table D1. Correlations 
 GDPPCGR M2GRREAL POPGR GROSSAVGDP DOMCREPRIVSEC VIX 
M2GRREAL 0.4285 1.0000     
POPGR -0.2508 -0.0157 1.0000    
GROSSAVGDP 0.1388 0.0680 -0.0237 1.0000   
DOMCREPRIVSEC -0.3839 -0.1229 0.5991 -0.2372 1.0000  
VIX -0.3896 -0.2210 -0.0404 -0.1025 -0.0163 1.0000 
CROSSBORDER 0.6083 0.3859 0.0700 0.2025 -0.1349 -0.6561 
 
 
